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Let me first say that I am in awe of Joe’s vast contribution to 
economics. His ability to build a model with which to analyze some 
behavior, its causes and effects, is phenomenal. I am going to talk 
about a disagreement I have with him in macroeconomic policy – his 
choice models – but that takes nothing away from my admiration for 
his gigantic contribution to the stock of economic knowledge. 
It’s good to have a session on macroeconomics in view of the long 
slide in almost all the economies of the West. Labor force participation 
rates of men have suffered a particularly serious decline: In the U.S., 
the rate slid from nearly 94% in the mid-‘60s to around 86% around 
2005 and around 84% now; in Italy, from nearly 89% in the mid-’70s 
to nearly 85% in the mid-‘80s and 81% around 2005; in France, from 
86% in the early ‘80s to around 83% in 2005.† Wage rates have slowed 
in one country after another since the 1960s – first here and later in 
most of Europe. What is at issue is the cause and cure. 
Joe Stiglitz says that the U.S. wage slowdown results from a 
weakness of “demand” – brought on by increases in inequality. Larry 
Summers speaks of “secular stagnation,” which he says results from a 
                                                          
* Author of Mass Flourishing (Princeton, 2013) and “What’s Wrong with the West’s 
Economies,” New York Review of Books, Summer Issue, 2015, pages 54-56. 
†
  Immigration into France and more strongly Germany has turned participation rates 
around. But one suspects the participation rates of the native population have declined. 
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deficiency of “demand.” They and many other economists see 
increases in deficit spending to be a solution to the losses of prosperity. 
Apparently they are both relying on Keynesian theory – the family 
of Keynesian models. But, as I heard Bob Solow tell MIT students (in 
a course I had the honor of teaching with him in 1963), 
macroeconomics is a collection of theories. The Keynesian theory is 
just one of several theories. (In a little book of lectures I identified 7 
schools of macroeconomic thought.) Joe knows this, but Keynesian 
theory evidently dominates his thinking on macroeconomic matters. 
In the 1960s – a decade of extraordinary creativity, as Duncan 
Foley once commented – a number of macroeconomists started to 
venture away from the Keynesian doctrine that had grown dominant in 
the 1940s and 1950s. As you know, some upstart theorists built 
“microeconomic foundations” for a link from demand to employment 
dynamics. In arguing that the level of aggregate demand had no 
sustained effect on aggregate activity, they were subversive of 
Keynesian activism in monetary policymaking. Another line of new 
models implied that sustained deficit spending was not just ineffective 
at sustaining high employment: It was actually damaging for 
employment – and not only employment. 
I don’t know who was first. I recall that sometime in the ‘60s 
Franco Modigliani showed a diagram in which the public debt creates a 
wedge between wealth and capital. A helicopter drop of public debt 
adds to wealth and depresses capital. Franco argued that the loss of 
capital reduced labor productivity, thus wages and maybe employment. 
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I also recall my 1965 book, Fiscal Neutrality toward Economic 
Growth.‡ In the model there, public debt makes people feel richer than 
they are really are – they own debt on top of their ownership of capital 
– thus inducing households to consume more than they would have had 
they understood their lifetime consumption possibilities had not been 
increased by the public debt they held. My emphasis was on the 
corollary that, feeling richer, they cut back their supply of labor – 
entering the labor force later or retiring sooner. Of course, people 
might have been over-saving and over-working out of anxiety before 
the public debt was created. But, absent such anxiety, I concluded that 
public debt creation is damaging for our economic health. 
In the second half of the ‘60s Ken Arrow and my former student 
Mordecai Kurz published several papers on fiscal policy, culminating 
in their 1970 book Public Investment, the Rate of Return and Optimal 
Fiscal Policy.§ They note that the “viewpoint” in my book is “similar” 
to theirs while noting that my book “emphasizes the labor-leisure 
margin” and their book the “saving-consumption margin.” (p. 180). 
There was another difference. I had worked within the framework 
of a finite-lifetime saving model while they worked with Frank 
Ramsey’s infinite horizon. So in my work the question didn’t arise of 
whether infinitely-lived worker-savers would be led to save less and 
work less by the increase of public debt. There was another 
unanswered question: I argued from my model that government capital 
expenditures ought to be tax-financed, just as the government’s current 
expenditures ought to be tax-financed. I said that if the government 
                                                          
‡
  Edmund Phelps, Fiscal Neutrality toward Economic Growth, (McGraw-Hill, 1965). 
§
  Kenneth J. Arrow and Mordecai Kurz, Public Investment, The Rate of Return and Optimal 
Fiscal Policy (Johns Hopkins, 1970).  
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creates an uncrowded bridge, it’s right to deficit-finance the 
construction and service the debt with tolls on use of the bridge. But if 
in a rainy country the government creates sunshine with no possibility 
of user fees, there is no such case for deficit financing. The sunshine 
project ought to be tax-financed. Jim Tobin thought I was wrong about 
that – at least in Frank Ramsey’s infinite-horizon framework.** 
So what is the answer? Would even the super intelligent Ramsey 
savers be led to under-save and under-work when the government 
deficit-finances its expenditures – even investment expenditure? I take 
an extreme case in which the state is engaging in sustained investment 
in some sort of public capital good – one that does not get into 
households’ utility functions and production functions. 
In the Appendix I show that, even in the steady-growth state, a 
wedge has been driven between wealth and capital in two ways: First, 
the steady-growth deficit shifts up the steady-growth path of private 
wealth. Secondly, the steady-growth public capital investment, in 
crowding out private investment, shifts down the steady-growth path of 
private capital. See the steady-state equations. In the phase diagram, 
the stationary locus of normalized wealth is shifted rightward and that 
of normalized capital per worker is shifted leftward. The saddle path in 
terms of normalized wealth is shifted up (and the corresponding path of 
normalized capital is shifted down). If the economy would have been 
in the Golden Rule state or short of that, the bloating of wealth would 
be harmful and so would the crowding out of private capital. In a richer 
model, greater unemployment and reduced innovation might result. 
                                                          
**
  Our plane landed without our reaching an agreement. We never discussed the issue again. 
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Appendix: Incidence of Government Spending and Public Debt 
 
